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Abstract
I analyze the relationship between economics and politics across eight parliamentary
elections in four transition countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. I
argue that support for reform reflects the balance between positive and negative effects of the
reform. Accordingly, I identify economic groups that support or oppose the reform. The former
are private entrepreneurs, white collar workers and university educated voters. The latter are
the unemployed, retirees, and blue collar and agricultural workers. This general pattern holds
both within countries and across countries, and across tenures of different governments. In
contrast with the responsibility hypothesis, voters in the transition countries are found to be
forward looking, not retrospective.
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1 Introduction
Political development in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
reveals a peculiar pattern: The collapse of communism occurred amidst overwhelming popular
support for fundamental economic and political reforms. However, only a few years later the
pendulum swung back and the reformers were voted out. Instead, the voters turned towards
parties that challenged radical economic transition – ex-communists, social democrats, and
nationalists.
1 In this paper, I attempt to explain the deterioration of support for reforms, by
pointing out to the differences in adverse effects of reforms – both across countries as well as
within countries. I argue that the economic effects of reforms – such as unemployment and
growth of a new private sector – determine the political support for parties associated with
implementing the reforms. To capture this effect, I construct a unique data set containing
regional (county level) election results and economic data for the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovakia. I analyze the link between the former and the latter by regressing the
regional election results on selected socio-economic indicators.
This paper seeks to contribute to two distinct streams in the economic literature: political
sustainability of reform, and voting/popularity functions. The former analyzes the relationship
between adverse effects of reform and its political sustainability. An early example is
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) who discuss the role played by individual uncertainty about the
distribution of winners and losers. Others, for example Agion and Blanchard (1995),
Blanchard (1997), Rodrik (1995) and Fidrmuc (1998), emphasize the role played by excessive
unemployment.
2
Voting and popularity functions (VP-functions) bring together economics and political
science. Typically, empirical results indicate that the voters hold the current government
responsible for state of the economy.
3 I explore the interactions between economics and
politics in the specific context of political and economic transition in CEE. I argue that instead
of punishing or rewarding the government for economic performance, elections in the
transition countries serve as referenda on the speed of reforms, and the overall reform
strategy.
                                               
1 The Czech Republic and Estonia have long resisted this trend, whereas in Poland, Romania and Hungary
the pendulum returned again and brought the pro-reform parties back into power.
2 A comprehensive survey of literature is beyond the scope of the present paper; see Dewatripont and
Roland (1996), and Rodrik (1996) for extensive discussion.3
The contribution of this paper should also be seen in presenting the most comprehensive
analysis of voting in transition countries so far (covering four nations and eight elections), and
presenting results that are comparable across countries.
4
In the next section, I introduce the data set I used, and present the results of the empirical
analysis. I then discuss the results and offer some concluding remarks in the last section.
2 Empirical Analysis
Essentially, the objective of my paper is to explain the recent political developments in the
transition countries of CEE by linking them to the underlying economic processes. The basic
idea is that the voters’ decisions are affected by the state of the economy at the moment of the
election, and/or their expectations of future economic developments. The process of economic
reform has played a fundamental role in determining the current state of the economy.
Therefore, I seek to identify the relationship between voters’ support for economic reforms,
and election outcomes.
5
Typically, the links between economics and elections are studied using time-series data.
6
This approach is not possible in the transition countries of CEE because only three or four
elections have taken place since the fall of communism. For that reason, I used regional data,
where both election results as well as explanatory variables are observed at the level of
individual counties.
7 I analyze the following elections (see Table 1 for election results):
• Czech Republic: the Chamber of Deputies (lower house), 1992 and 1996, both resulting
in reelection of pro-reform government;
• Hungary: the Parliament (those seats that were awarded by proportional vote), 1994
(transition from right wing to post-communist dominated government) and 1998
(transition from post-communists to right wing);
                                                                                                                                           
3 Nannestad and Paldam (1994) present an extensive survey of this literature; Paldam (1991) analyzes the
robustness of this relationship.
4 Other, mainly single country analyses, are Munich and Sorm (1995) for Czech and Slovak elections in
1992, Jackson et al. (1996) and Bell (1997) for Polish 1993 election, and Pacek (1994) covering Bulgaria in
1991, Poland in 1991, and Czechoslovakia in 1992. Earle et al. (1997) and Mateju and Rehakova (1996),
analyze opinion-poll data from the Czech Republic. Finally, Lafay (1981) analyzes the relationship between
economics and politics under communist regime in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Poland, and Romania during 1960’s and 1970’s.
5 From the point of view of this analysis, it is important whether a particular party was perceived as pro-
reform or anti-reform prior to the election. As it turned out, ex-communists in Hungary and Poland continued
in reforms ex post even though they appeared opposed to radical reforms ex ante.
6 See, for example, Fair (1978, 1996), and Paldam (1991).
7 Application of this approach has been rather limited so far – an exception is Rattinger (1991).4
• Poland: the Sejm (lower house), 1993 (transition from right wing to post-communist
dominated government) and 1997 (transition from post-communists to right wing), and the
presidential election in 1995;
• Slovakia: the National Council, 1992 (transition from pro-reform government to a
nationalist one) and 1994 (transition from pro-reform government
8 to one dominated by
nationalists).
I focus on the second and subsequent elections after the collapse of the communist regime.
The first post-communists elections are not included because they took place before the
process of economic reforms started, and it is unlikely that reform-related issues played a role.
Instead, the first free elections appeared to be dominated by the post-communist euphoria
rather than economic issues.
The unit of analysis is always the county (micro-regions, called ‘okres’ in the Czech and
Slovak Republics, ‘megye’ in Hungary and ‘wojewodztwo’ in Poland). The sample size is 76
for the Czech Republic, 38 for Slovakia, 20 for Hungary and 49 for Poland. The data were
compiled from various publications of the national Statistical Offices of the respective
countries.
To explain the regional differences in patterns of political support, I regressed the electoral
results of individual parties on a set of economic and demographic variables (see Table 2). To
ensure comparability, I tried to use the same set of explanatory variables for all countries and
elections. The following economic indicators were used: the unemployment rate, the average
wage, the number of small individual entrepreneurs and self-employed (as percentage of
population, excluding farmers), and the share of employment in industry and agriculture.
Demographic indicators included were the (logarithm of) population density, and the
proportions of population in the following categories: post-productive age (retirement age as
determined by the national standards
9), university educated (not available for Hungary),
Roman Catholics (not available for Hungary and Poland), and national minorities (Moravian in
the Czech Republic, and Hungarian and Roma in Slovakia).
10 The variables used were
generally end-of-year values of the election year, except for wages, which were the average
                                               
8 The nationalist government elected in 1992 was dismissed in March 1994, and replaced with a grand
coalition of the remaining parties. The nationalists regained office in September 1994.
9 Differences in national limits for retirement explain the low figure for Poland in Table 2.
10 Bohemia and Moravia are the two parts of the Czech Republic. Although Czech is spoken in both parts,
16% of Czech citizens reported Moravian nationality in the 1991census. Hungarians, making up 11 % of
Slovak population, are mainly concentrated in regions along the Hungarian border. It is estimated that Roma
make up between 3-8% of Slovak population.5
values of the election year.
11 The statistics reveal a rather uneven regional distribution of costs
and benefits of reforms (see Table 2). Unemployment rate is lower and wages are higher in
some regions, especially urban areas, while rural areas are often stricken with extremely high
unemployment and low wages. Other variables show substantial regional differences as well.
Voting results also vary substantially from region to region (see the information on election
results in the bottom panels of Tables 3 through 10).
The estimated equation has the following form:
Vt,j = a +Si gi·Xi,t+ et,j (1)
where Vt,j stands for the share of votes received by party j in period t; Xi,t are the
explanatory economic and demographic variables, and et,j is the error term. The full list of
regressors includes between nine and twelve variables while the sample sizes are between 20
and 76. To reduce the degrees-of-freedom problem, I first ran the regressions with the full list
of explanatory variables. Then, I stepwise eliminated the variables that were not even
marginally significant (in general, with t-statistics below one), starting with the least significant
ones and continuing until the adjusted R
2 was maximized. Clearly, parties differ with respect to
the policies they advocate and the social and/or economic groups they appeal to. Hence, it is
obvious that different variables will be significant for different parties.
The estimation was performed by the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) method.
With SUR, regression equations for all parties participating in an election are estimated jointly,
with equations being linked by their disturbances.
12 Allowing the error terms et,j to be
correlated across parties indirectly implements the adding up contstraint – the parties together
cannot receive more than 100% of the votes, and hence higher support for one party in a
region must also imply lower support for the other parties.
The results of individual-election regressions are reported in Tables 3-10. The Tables list
the parties according to their position along the political spectrum – starting with the right
wing pro-reform parties, then the left wing parties, and finally the nationalist and extremist
parties, and parties representing national minorities.
Clearly, economics played an important role in shaping the political developments in the
transition countries. From the results listed in the Tables, one can observe the general patterns
                                               
11 There were a few exception to this rule: demographic data were not available on a yearly basis and the
nearest available year was used. In addition, in a few cases where a particular variable was not available for the
election year, the year preceding the election was used.
12 See Greene (1997, pp. 674-676).6
of voting behavior of individual social and/or economic groups. In contrast with the typical
finding in the literature on voting and popularity functions (see Nannestad and Paldam
(1994)), incumbency status of parties does not appear to play an important role. The
‘responsibility hypothesis’ implies that the voters hold the government responsible for the state
of the economy. Accordingly then, the regions with low unemployment should display lower
support for the government, regardless of its political orientation. This is not the case in CEE.
On the contrary, the patterns of support are quite stable, and do not change much when a
party moves from the opposition to the government, or vice versa.
Voting behavior in the transition countries thus appears to be essentially forward looking,
not retrospective. Voters support parties, which they expect to deliver policies favorable to
them. In summary, support for the pro-reform right wing parties is thus negatively related to
unemployment, positively to the measure of private entrepreneurial activity, urban population
(reflected by population density), and share of voters with university education. Proportion of
retirees in the region’s population is negatively related to the support for pro-reform parties,
except in the Czech Republic. Support for the left wing parties, on the other hand, is positively
correlated with unemployment and share of population in retirement age (again with the
exception of the Czech Republic). It is negatively related to the measure of private
entrepreneurial activity, population density, and share of voters with university education.
Finally, the pattern of support for nationalists and extremist seems rather hard to identify using
the variables included in the estimation.
Unemployment
Unemployment has been the most acute consequence of economic transition in CEE. From
virtually zero, the unemployment rate shot up to in excess of ten percent in most countries.
Regression results indicate that unemployment generally reduces support for parties associated
with economic reforms, and increases support for post-communist and other left wing parties.
The effect of unemployment is quite strong and most cases statistically significant.
Low unemployment clearly helped the reelection of the reformers in the Czech Republic
both in 1992 and 1996. While the relationship can already be identified in 1992 results, greater
significance of the coefficients for 1996 indicates that unemployment played a more important
role in that election. To illustrate the importance of unemployment in 1996, simple calculation
reveals that one percentage point of unemployment implied a loss of 1.5 percentage point for
the government coalition composed of conservatives (ODS and ODA), and Christian7
democrats (KDU-CSL). Correspondingly, social democrats (CSSD) and communists (KSCM)
enjoyed a gain of 1.4 percentage point.
The results for Slovakia are similar. DS (conservative) and DU (center-liberal) show a
negative effect of unemployment. On the other hand, the post-communists (SDL) in 1992,
communists (KSS) in 1996, and nationalists (HZDS and SNS) in 1996 all show a positive
relationship.
In the case of Hungary, two out of three pro-reform parties – MDF and SzDSz
13 – show
consistently negative and significant impact of unemployment. Both the former communists
(MSzP) and hard-line communists (MP) show positive effect of unemployment in the two
elections.
In Poland, electoral results of the main pro-reform parties (UD and BBWR in 1993, AWS
and UW in 1997) were negatively affected by unemployment. On the other hand,
unemployment increased the support for the post-communists (SLD and PSL). It played an
important role also in 1995 presidential election in Poland, where it helped the post-communist
candidate Alexander Kwasniewski to oust Lech Walesa.
14
Entrepreneurial Activity
If there is a social group that is virtually bound to support reforms, it is the private
entrepreneurs. Private enterprises were virtually non-existent under the communist regime.
Just as unemployment, they arose as a direct consequence of the reforms. While the
unemployed may see a slow-down or reversal of the reforms as a remedy to their declining
living standards, the very livelihood of the entrepreneurs hinges on the success of economic
transition. Therefore, one should expect higher support for the pro-reform parties and lower
support for the left-wing parties in the regions with greater entrepreneurial activity. To
account for the emerging private sector, I used the number of small private (unincorporated)
entrepreneurs, excluding farmers, expressed as percentage of population. Clearly, this captures
only the small business part of the private sector. Nevertheless, this is probably highly
correlated with the actual size of the private sector. The results show a negative effect of
                                               
13 Even though SzDSz eventually entered into post-election coalition with the former communists, they
were perceived as pro-reforms before the election.
14 In a separate regression (not reported here), I regressed the presidential election results on
unemployment and the results of the 1993 parliamentary election – to account for ideological motives (the
equation for Kwasniewski thus contained the regional results for SLD and PSL while the equations for Walesa
contained UP, UD and BBWR). The effect of unemployment remained significant and retained the expected
sign.8
private entrepreneurial activity on support for left-wing parties, and a positive effect on
support for pro-reform parties.
The effect of entrepreneurial activity in the Czech Republic was stronger in 1992 than in
1996. All four pro-reform parties, ODS, ODA, KDU-CSL and OH show positive coefficients
in 1992, whereas only ODS yields a marginally significant coefficient in 1996. On the other
hand, entrepreneurial activity significantly reduced the support for the left wing, LB and CSSD
in 1992 and KSCM in 1996, as well as the extremist republicans (SPR-RSC) in both elections.
Slovak results are trickier. Among the pro-reform parties, Christian Democrats (KDH)
benefited from entrepreneurial activity in 1992 only, whereas DU and DS actually show
negative coefficients in 1994. Social democrats (SDSS) also show a positive relationship in
1992. On the other hand, support for HZDS, the winner of both elections, was negatively
correlated with entrepreneurial activity in 1992, however, this pattern reversed in 1994. The
reversal perhaps reflects the fact that while prior to the 1992 election HZDS was generally
seen as a threat to reform, this expectation was not fulfilled. Extreme leftist ZRS did not fare
well in regions with high numbers of entrepreneurs. Rather surprisingly, the nationalists, SNS,
enjoyed the support of entrepreneurs in 1994.
Entrepreneurs in Hungary supported the future winners in both elections – first former
communists (MSzP) in 1994, and Fidesz in 1998. On the other hand, the liberals, (SzDSz)
show a negative relationship in both elections, although only marginally significant.
In Poland, pro-reform parties (UD, BBWR and UP) benefited from entrepreneurial activity
in 1993. In 1997, only UW showed a positive relationship, while the Solidarity coalition was
affected negatively (not significantly). While the coefficients for the ruling post-communist
parties (SLD and PSL) are both positive in 1997, they are not significant. Nevertheless,
entrepreneurial activity strongly improved the showing of the post-communist presidential
candidate Kwasniewski.
Sectoral Reallocation
Economic transition has caused substantial reallocations among sectors. Typically, firms
operating in the service sector benefited from the reforms whereas industrial and agricultural
enterprises often experienced severe problems. To capture the sector-specific effects, I
included the share of employment in industry and agriculture in the regressions. Industrial and
agricultural employees are typically blue collar workers. One can expect that they have
benefited less from the transition compared to white-collar workers, and therefore will be9
more likely to support parties challenging reforms. Indeed, industrial employment in general
increases support for some left-wing and nationalist parties, and reduces support for pro-
reform parties. However, compared to the economic variables discussed above, this
relationship is less consistent across parties and different elections. Similarly, agricultural
employment seems to negatively affect the pro-reform parties and benefit left-wing parties.
Moreover, agricultural employment is positively correlated with support for those parties that
cater specifically to the interests of this sector. This is, for example, the case of KDU-CSL in
the Czech Republic, FKgP in Hungary, and PSL in Poland.
Wages
Finally, with the inclusion of average wages I intended to capture the uneven distribution of
benefits of the reforms in terms of income. One can expect that high wages will increase
support for reforms, when controlling for other potential factors (unemployment,
entrepreneurial activity).
However, it is rather hard to identify a clear pattern in the relationship between support for
reforms and wages. This is perhaps because the effect usually attributed to wages in the voting
and popularity literature is already captured here by the other economic variables.
15
Interestingly enough, wages seem to be positively linked to the support for communist and
post-communist parties throughout the region: LB and KSCM in the Czech Republic, SV and
KSS in Slovakia, MSzP in Hungary and PSL in Poland. On the other hand, some of the pro-
reform parties were also ‘rewarded’ by support of high-income regions: ODA (in 1992) and
ODS (1996) in the Czech Republic, ODU, DS and DU in Slovakia, Fidesz in Hungary in
1994, and UD in Poland in 1993. Finally, parties close to the political center – KDU-CSL and
SD/LSNS in the Czech Republic, SDSS and HZDS in Slovakia, but also right wing AWS in
Poland – apparently enjoyed the support of low income regions.
Demographic Factors
Demographics should naturally have an effect on voters’ preferences. The retirees have been
hit disproportionately by the adverse effects of reform. Arguably, they can be expected to have
different preferences regarding radical reforms than the younger population. The log of
population density is intended to serve as proxy for the urbanization of the region. The higher
                                               
15 Opinion polls usually suggest that right wing parties in CEE derive support from individuals with
higher incomes. These are typically entrepreneurs, white collar workers, and highly educated people – these
economic groups are already controlled for in the regressions.10
the population density, the greater in general the share of region’s population living in towns.
Finally, the share of national minorities is intended to capture their specific political
preferences and the effect of potential political controversies related to them. The Hungarian
and Roma minorities are included in Slovak regressions, Moravian minority is used in Czech
regressions.
In general, greater share of pensioners in region’s population improves the showing of left
wing parties, and in some cases also nationalists and extremists. There are a few exceptions
though: Czech retirees supported the ruling reformers from ODS, ODA, and KSU-CSL,
whereas Hungarian Socialists’ result in 1998 indicates a negative relationship. The results for
population density are mixed, although in most cases pro-reform parties derive support from
regions with high population density (urban areas) whereas left wing and nationalist/extremist
parties do well in rural areas. This pattern is rather strong in Slovakia and Poland, in
particular. Areas with a high share of university educated residents generally show higher
support for pro-reform parties and low support for left wing parties. The main exceptions are
the nationalist SNS and extreme left ZRS in Slovakia, and Walensa’s BBWR movement in
Poland. Finally, a rather interesting result is obtained for Catholics in Slovakia: their support
for Christian Democrats, the party typically associated with catholic church, is substantially
lower than their support for nationalists in HZDS, and especially SNS.
3 Conclusions
The empirical results presented above indicate that there is indeed a strong relationship
between economic developments and voting behavior in the transition countries. Uneven
distribution of benefits and costs of reform creates winners and losers, and thus constituencies
supporting or opposing radical economic reform. Consequently, it is the balance between
positive and adverse effects of the reforms that underlies the differences in political
development across transition countries, rather than differences in history, culture, or the
extent of post-communist legacy. The same general pattern of interactions between economics
and politics holds within as well as across the four countries analyzed. The pattern of support
is also remarkably stable over the tenures of different governments. This is particularly evident
from the estimates pertaining to the 1997 election in Poland and 1998 election in Hungary,
where the unemployed (and retirees in Poland) supported the incumbent left wing parties and
opposed the pro-reform challengers. This stands in stark contrast with the prevailing result11
obtained by scholars studying voting and popularity functions in developed countries, namely
that “incumbents benefit from an expanding economy and challengers thrive on misery.”
16.
The result indicating stable patterns of support has an intriguing implication for party
politics in transition: we should see right wing parties concerned about combating
unemployment whereas left wing parties can get away with implementing harsh austerity
measures and privatizing state-owned enterprises. As Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) argue,
the fact that left wing parties implement right wing policies can be understood by the voters as
a credible signal that such policies are indeed necessary – assuming politicians are better
informed about the state or the world than voters. On the other hand, the same policies
pursued by a right wing government would be seen as being ideologically motivated. Indeed, it
took the post-communists in Poland and Hungary to start comprehensive privatization
programs. The post-communists in Hungary also implemented extensive belt tightening
measures and pension reform shortly after assuming office. On the other hand, right wing
parties in the Czech Republic, despite establishing a reputation got being tough on reforms
early in the transition, generally avoided austerity measures later on (generally after 1993).
Instead, the government pursued rather soft policies by supporting rapid real wage growth,
failed to implement policies aimed at enterprise restructuring,
17 postponed bankruptcy
legislation, and implicitly reinstated the soft budget constraint by refinancing banks troubled by
bad loans. This became particularly pronounced after prime minister Klaus proclaimed in 1995
that transformation was over – until the bubble burst in Spring and Summer of 1997.
4 References
Aghion, Philippe and Olivier Jean Blanchard, 1995. On the Speed of Transition in Central
Europe, in: Stanley Fischer and Julio Rotemberg (Eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual
1994, Cambridge, MA, Nationa Bureau of Economic Research.
Alesina, Alberto and Howard Rosenthal, 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the
Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England.
Bell, Janice, 1997. Unemployment Matters: Voting Patterns during the Economic Transition in
Poland, 1990-1995, Europe-Asia Studies 49, 1263-91.
Blanchard, Olivier Jean, 1997. The Economics of Post-Communist Transition, Clarendon
Lectures in Economics, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
                                               
16 Alesina and Rosenthal (1995).12
Cukierman, Alex and Mariano Tommasi, 1998. When Does it Take a Nixon to Go to China,
American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Dewatripont, Mathias and Gérard Roland, 1996. Transition as a Process of Large-Scale
Institutional Change, Economics of Transition 4 (1), 1-30.
Earle, John, Scott Gehlbach, Jiøí Veèerník and Zuzana Šáková, 1997. Economic Reform,
Attitudes and Voting in the Czech Republic, Central European University, mimeo.
Fair, Ray C., 1978. The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President, The Review of
Economics and Statistics 60, May 1978, 159-173.
Fair, Ray C., 1996. Econometrics and Presidential Elections, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 10, Summer 1996, 89-102.
Fernandez, Raquel and Dani Rodrik, 1991. Resistance of Reform: Status Quo Bias in the
Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty, American Economic Review 81, 1146-1155.
Fidrmuc, Jan, 1998. Unemployment and the Dynamics of Political Support for Economic
Reforms, Journal of Policy Reform, forthcoming.
Fidrmucova, Jana, 1998. Restructuring in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: A Comparative
Empirical Study, Tilburg University, mimeo.
Greene, William H., 1997. Econometric Analysis, Prentice Hall International, third edition.
Jackson, John E., Jacek Klich and Krystyna Poznanska, 1996. Democratic Institutions and
Economic Reform: The Polish Case, University of Michigan, mimeo.
Lafay, Jean-Dominique, 1981. Empirical Analysis of Politico-Economic Interaction in East
European Countries, Soviet Studies 33, July 1981, 386-400.
Matejù, Petr and Blanka Øehaková, 1996. Turning Left or Class Realignment? Analysis of the
Changing Relationship between Class and Party in the Czech Republic, 1992-1996,
mimeo, Institute of Sociology, Czech Academy of Sciences.
Münich, Daniel and Vít Šorm, 1995. Socio-economic Background of Voting Behavior in
Transition, CERGE-EI, Prague, mimeo.
Nannestad, Peter and Martin Paldam, 1994. The VP-Function: A Survey of Literature on Vote
and Popularity Functions after 25 Years, Public Choice 79, 213-245.
Pacek, Alexander C., 1994. Macroeconomic Conditions and Electoral Politics in East Central
Europe, American Journal of Political Science 38, 723-44.
                                                                                                                                           
17 See Fidrmucova (1998) for some empirical evidence supporting this point.13
Paldam, Martin, 1991. How Robust is the Vote Function? A Study of Seventeen Nations over
Four Decades, in: Helmut Norpoth, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, and Jean-Dominique Lafay
(Eds.), Economics and Politics: The Calculus of Support, University of Michigan Press,
Ann Arbor, 9-32.
Rattinger, Hans, 1991. Unemployment and Elections in West Germany, in: Helmut Norpoth,
Michael S. Lewis-Beck, and Jean-Dominique Lafay (Eds.), Economics and Politics: The
Calculus of Support, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 49-62.
Rodrik, Dani, 1995. The Dynamics of Political Support for Reforms in Economies in
Transition, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 9, 403-25.
Rodrik, Dani, 1995. Understanding Economic Policy Reform, Journal of Economic Literature
34, 9-41.14
Table 1. Election Results
Czech R. 1992 Czech R. 1996
(Communist) Left Block (LB) 14.05 Communist Party (KSCM) 10.33
Social Democrats (CSSD) 6.53 Social Democrats (CSSD) 26.44
Liberal Social Union (LSU) 6.52 Free Democrats (SD-LSNS) 2.05
Civic Movement (OH)
 I 4.59 Democratic Union (DEU) 2.80
Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL)
 I,W 6.28 Christian Democrats (KDU-CSL)
 I,W 8.08
Civic Democratic Party (ODS-KDS)
 I,W
29.73 Civic Democratic Party (ODS)
 I,W 29.62
Civic Aliance (ODA)
 I,W 5.93 Civic Aliance (ODA)
 I,W 6.36
Republicans (SPR-RSC) 5.98 Republicans (SPR-RSC) 8.01
Moravian Movement (HSD-SMS) 5.87 Moravian Movement (HSMS) 0.42
Other 14.52 Other 5.89
Slovakia 1992 Slovakia 1994
Democratic Left (SDL) 14.70 Communist Party (KSS) 2.72
Social Democrats (SDSS) 4.00 Workers (ZRS)
 W 7.34
Civic Democratic Union (ODU)




 I 8.89 Democratic Union (ODU)
 I 8.57
Democratic Party (DS)
 I 3.31 Christian Democrats (KDH)
 I 10.08
Movement for Dem. Slovakia (HZDS)
W
37.26 Democratic Party (DS) 3.42
Slovak National Party (SNS) 7.93 Movement for Dem. Slovakia (HZDS)
 W
34.96
Hungarian Coalition (MK) 7.42 Slovak National Party (SNS)
 W 5.40
Hungarian Civic Party (MOS) 2.29 Hungarian Coalition (MK) 10.18
Other 10.16 Other 6.92
Hungary 1994 Hungary 1998
Communist Party (MP) 3.45 Communist Party (MP) 4.15
Socialist Party (MSzP)
 W 32.99 Socialist Party (MSzP)
 I 32.10
Free Democrats (SzDSz)
 W 19.74 Free Democrats (SzDSz)
 I 8.11
Democratic Forum (MDF)
 I 11.74 Democratic Forum (MDF) 3.13
Young Democrats (Fidesz)
 I 7.02 Fidesz
 W 28.37
Smallholders (FKgP) 8.82 Smallholders (FKgP)
 W 13.41
Christian Democrats (KDNP) 7.03 Hungarian Truth and Lie Party (MIEP) 5.64
Other 9.21 Other 5.09
Poland 1993 Poland 1997
Post-communists (SLD)
 W 20.40 Post-communists (SLD)
 I 27.13
Peasant Party (PSL)
 W 15.40 Peasant Party (PSL)
 I 7.31
Labor Union (UP)
 I 10.60 Labor Union (UP) 4.74
Walesa's Non-partisan Block (BBWR) 5.40 Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)
 W 33.83
Democratic Union (UD)
 I 10.60 Freedom Union (UW)
 W 13.37
Independent Poland (KPN) 5.80 Polish Reconstruction (ROP) 5.56
Other 31.80 Other 8.06
Notes: Parties are ordered according to their political orientation as left wing, right wing, and
nationalist/extremist, and denoted with abbreviated names as well as commonly used acronyms.
I member of government prior to the election; W member of government after the election15













Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev.
Czech Rep. 1992 2.90 1.41 4.57 0.36 9.08 1.99 38.32 7.63 11.69 6.44
Czech Rep. 1996 3.75 1.88 9.06 0.76 9.33 2.73 40.99 8.46 9.37 5.82
Slovakia 1992 11.82 3.65 4.19 0.32 5.19 1.54 33.95 8.99 11.84 7.23
Slovakia 1994 17.70 5.89 5.75 0.53 4.90 1.48 35.34 8.56 15.09 7.78
Hungary 1994 11.38 3.35 36.20 4.03 7.27 1.84 35.83 8.81 9.37 3.54
Hungary 1998 9.23 2.86 43.08 5.05 6.49 1.48 35.83 8.81 9.37 3.54
Poland 1993 18.16 5.62 0.354 0.035 4.29 1.08 21.67 6.48 32.30 15.42












Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev. Mean Std dev.
Czech Rep. 210.37 392.64 19.93 2.09 5.51 2.08 39.55 14.25 11.71 19.53
Slovakia 172.68 257.96 17.50 2.01 4.74 2.54 59.28 13.30 12.80 21.74
Hungary 518.74 392.83 19.30 1.52 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Poland 144.53 144.95 13.41 1.74 5.76 2.43 n.a. n.a.
Notes: Economic variables typically refer to the election year or the year immediately preceding the election. Demographic variables refer to different years in early 1990’s
depending on sources available.
1 Moravian minority in the Czech Republic, and Hungarian minority in Slovakia, respectively.16
Table 3. Regression Results, Czech Republic, 1992: Determinants of Voting Behavior.
Variable ODS-KDS ODA KDU/CSL OH LB CSSD LSU SPR-RSC HSD-SMS
t-stat pro-reform pro-reform pro-reform pro-reform left left left nationalist minority
Constant 30.924 5.46 -14.175 2.90 -6.134 1.69 4.036 2.24 18.601 4.22 16.232 10.14 9.365 2.78 23.384 7.27 -6.677 1.91
Unemployment
1 -0.570 2.56 -0.231 3.12 0.335 1.99 -0.171 1.96 0.664 4.49
Wages
2 -1.280 1.37 2.182 2.92 -1.103 2.06 -0.256 0.85 2.483 3.49 -1.407 2.38
Entrepreneurs
3,4 0.427 2.44 0.280 1.99 0.228 2.37 0.130 2.10 -0.733 5.82 -0.140 2.07 -0.514 4.10
Industry
5 -0.038 1.16 0.098 3.20 -0.113 4.03 0.051 1.44 -0.080 1.89 0.043 0.96
Agriculture
5 -0.239 4.72 0.097 2.04 -0.049 1.57 0.341 7.06 -0.197 3.19 0.073 1.02
Pop.density [log] 0.461 1.07 -0.494 1.29 -0.429 1.89 -0.345 0.77 1.734 3.32
Retirees
4 0.565 4.94 0.161 2.03 -0.177 3.00 -0.166 1.39 -0.305 2.66
R. Catholic
4 0.040 1.41 -0.062 2.44 0.211 12.00 0.012 1.16 -0.127 6.23 -0.021 1.85 -0.049 2.67 0.060 2.92
Univ. Educated
4 0.683 4.37 -0.095 0.65 0.146 2.95 -0.317 2.00 0.233 1.50 -0.319 1.95 -0.126 0.63
Moravian
4 -0.145 7.72 -0.026 1.57 0.047 4.13 -0.034 5.05 0.048 3.48 -0.047 5.95 -0.070 7.00 0.282 20.11
R^2 0.749 0.501 0.886 0.557 0.630 0.671 0.725 0.354 0.928
Adjusted R^2 0.723 0.457 0.873 0.519 0.580 0.637 0.701 0.297 0.919
National Vote 29.73 5.93 6.28 4.59 14.05 6.53 6.52 5.98 5.87
Std. Deviation 4.71 3.22 4.05 1.25 2.67 1.62 3.07 2.45 7.00
Notes: T-statistics in italics. Number of observations: 76. Estimation method: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR).
1 Unemployment rate in percent; 
2 Wage in thousands, national currency; 
3 Individual small entrepreneurs and/or self-employed, excl. farmers; 
4 Percentage of total
population; 
5 Percentage of total employment.17
Table 4. Regression Results, Czech Republic, 1996: Determinants of Voting Behavior.
Variable ODS ODA KDU/CSL SD/LSNS DEU CSSD KSCM SPR-RSC HSMS
t-stat pro-reform pro-reform pro-reform pro-reform pro-reform left left nationalist minority
Constant 18.739 3.52 6.248 3.92 -0.270 0.07 4.373 4.22 2.779 2.26 32.462 5.48 9.357 3.02 18.251 6.54 -0.386 1.11
Unemployment
1 -0.994 5.84 -0.319 4.25 -0.172 1.38 -0.136 4.51 -0.044 1.09 0.982 5.26 0.427 4.26 0.297 2.65
Wages
2 0.948 2.68 -0.931 2.81 -0.201 2.33 0.196 1.65 -1.203 2.56 1.095 3.74 0.063 1.80
Entrepreneurs
3,4 0.189 1.74 0.031 1.41 -0.155 2.57 -0.072 1.00 -0.005 0.77
Industry
5 -0.106 3.04 0.097 3.84 0.082 2.54 -0.046 1.93 -0.034 1.32 -0.004 1.51
Agriculture
5 -0.372 5.69 -0.119 3.81 -0.044 2.56 0.227 3.11 0.218 4.81 0.045 0.92 0.006 1.20
Pop.density [log] -0.628 2.31 -0.688 4.27 2.527 4.51 -0.950 2.70 0.380 1.18 0.061 1.29
Retirees
4 0.501 3.85 0.161 2.37 0.172 1.60 0.036 1.30 0.057 1.62 -0.776 4.41 -0.251 2.75
R. Catholic
4 0.039 1.40 0.220 13.75 -0.025 6.82 -0.097 5.69 -0.102 5.48
Univ. Educated
4 0.275 3.56 0.218 1.61 0.050 1.57 0.158 3.42 -0.157 1.24 -0.371 3.18 -0.058 3.58
Moravian
4 -0.100 5.40 0.019 3.10 0.013 0.95 -0.019 5.58 -0.046 2.85 0.061 5.32 0.018 1.44 0.033 29.98
R^2 0.762 0.542 0.815 0.514 0.611 0.581 0.622 0.583 0.942
Adjusted R^2 0.734 0.502 0.796 0.479 0.564 0.537 0.571 0.526 0.936
National Vote 29.62 6.36 8.08 2.05 2.80 26.44 10.33 8.01 0.42
Std. Deviation 4.80 1.48 4.04 0.62 0.80 4.01 2.22 2.39 0.65
Notes: T-statistics in italics. Number of observations: 76. Estimated as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR).
1 Unemployment rate in percent; 
2 Wage in thousands, national currency; 
3 Individual small entrepreneurs and/or self-employed, excl. farmers; 
4 Percentage of total
population; 
5 Percentage of total employment.18
Table 5. Regression Results, Slovak Republic, 1992: Determinants of Voting Behavior.
Variable KDH ODU DS SDL SDSS HZDS SNS MK MOS
t-stat pro-reform pro-reform pro-reform left left nationalist nationalist minority minority
Constant 15.635 1.71 -6.675 1.46 -2.478 0.70 24.412 8.18 4.541 1.12 68.503 4.43 -12.162 2.59 -6.650 1.66 7.466 2.46
Unemployment
1 -0.044 0.86 0.257 2.95 -0.176 3.26
Wages
2 -0.757 0.43 2.567 2.68 1.642 2.40 -0.847 0.99 -4.044 1.33 -0.674 0.92
Entrepreneurs
3,4 0.683 1.75 0.268 0.79 0.646 3.44 -1.753 2.38 0.220 1.64
Industry
5 0.063 1.34 -0.100 2.63 -0.043 2.02 0.038 1.28 0.099 2.26 0.037 1.58
Agriculture
5 0.263 3.10 -0.059 1.18 -0.042 1.24 0.112 1.45 0.190 4.62 -0.585 3.25 0.073 1.99 -0.001 0.02
Pop.density [log] 1.760 3.90 0.503 1.91 -3.019 3.50 -0.483 0.87 1.435 4.16 -0.550 1.58
Retirees
4 -0.973 4.46 0.869 2.57 0.395 2.67 0.180 1.82 -0.344 3.52
R. Catholic
4 0.080 2.44 -0.044 2.32 -0.026 2.10 -0.257 7.33 -0.063 3.83 0.192 2.58 0.115 4.63
Univ. Educated
4 -0.436 2.72 1.036 5.66 -0.217 1.80
Hungarian
4 -0.151 6.51 -0.040 2.43 -0.019 1.80 -0.143 5.49 -0.067 5.68 -0.397 7.38 -0.031 1.55 0.669 58.87 0.279 22.85
Roma
4 1.017 3.47 0.340 2.20 0.236 2.18 1.229 4.29 0.515 3.65 -3.504 5.79 -0.323 1.56 0.091 1.00
R^2 0.793 0.527 0.633 0.787 0.680 0.838 0.775 0.994 0.952
Adjusted R^2 0.736 0.397 0.531 0.745 0.605 0.793 0.723 0.993 0.941
National Vote 8.89 4.04 3.31 14.70 4.00 37.26 7.93 7.42 2.29
Std. Deviation 5.36 2.21 1.63 5.95 2.18 14.24 3.74 15.27 5.55
Notes: T-statistics in italics. Number of observations: 38. Estimation method: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR).
1 Unemployment rate in percent; 
2 Wage in thousands, national currency; 
3 Individual small entrepreneurs and/or self-employed, excl. farmers; 
4 Percentage of total
population; 
5 Percentage of total employment.19
Table 6. Regression Results, Slovak Republic, 1994: Determinants of Voting Behavior.
Variable KDH DU DS SV ZRS KSS HZDS SNS MK
t-stat pro-reform pro-reform pro-reform left left left nationalist nationalist minority
Constant 22.267 3.46 -7.154 1.55 -1.776 0.97 1.116 0.19 19.719 5.00 6.918 2.60 51.198 3.74 -9.256 2.74 0.650 0.21
Unemployment
1 -0.202 2.57 -0.076 2.45 -0.140 2.01 0.092 2.42 0.301 1.96 0.108 2.20 -0.076 2.17
Wages
2 4.184 5.23 1.185 3.65 2.722 3.58 0.242 0.51 -7.898 5.38 -0.490 1.12
Entrepreneurs
3,4 -0.752 2.55 -0.152 1.38 -0.510 2.05 0.941 1.74 0.401 2.17
Industry
5 -0.089 1.62 -0.149 3.54 -0.047 0.97 0.052 1.17 -0.020 0.90 0.220 2.10 0.100 2.84 0.017 0.64
Agriculture
5 0.200 2.42 0.108 1.73 0.101 2.02 -0.399 3.08 -0.050 1.28 0.070 2.07
Pop.density [log] 1.251 2.21 0.607 1.37 -1.036 2.35 -0.358 1.21 -1.152 1.26 -0.631 1.90 1.004 3.78
Retirees
4 -1.168 4.81 0.157 1.04 -0.217 1.85 1.384 3.82 0.249 2.78 -0.158 2.11
R. Catholic
4 0.062 2.19 -0.009 1.20 -0.099 4.74 -0.106 5.53 -0.061 5.11 0.138 2.80 0.082 5.93 0.007 0.65
Univ. Educated
4 0.073 0.41 0.091 1.14 -0.289 1.32 0.360 1.96 -0.125 0.86 0.458 2.93 -0.133 0.83
Hungarian
4 -0.187 6.95 -0.040 2.42 -0.011 1.62 -0.061 3.48 -0.052 3.42 -0.023 2.48 -0.461 9.64 -0.031 2.67 0.941 103.78
Roma
4 0.515 1.92 0.267 1.45 0.243 3.33 0.725 3.62 0.604 3.81 -2.249 4.24 -0.396 3.33
R^2 0.794 0.803 0.753 0.711 0.838 0.636 0.891 0.856 0.999
Adjusted R^2 0.745 0.749 0.695 0.618 0.785 0.551 0.850 0.803 0.998
National Vote 10.08 8.57 3.42 10.41 7.34 2.72 34.96 5.40 10.18
Std. Deviation 5.45 3.41 1.27 2.89 3.23 1.18 13.30 2.45 20.67
Notes: T-statistics in italics. Number of observations: 38. Estimation method: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR).
1 Unemployment rate in percent; 
2 Wage in thousands, national currency; 
3 Individual small entrepreneurs and/or self-employed, excl. farmers; 
4 Percentage of total
population; 
5 Percentage of total employment.20
Table 7. Regression Results, Hungary 1994: Determinants of Voting Behavior.
Variable Fidesz MDF SzDSz MSzP MP KDNP FKgP
t-stat pro-reform pro-reform pro-reform left left nationalist Nationalist
Constant 8.848 3.92 22.057 5.64 38.658 8.07 -6.931 0.70 -11.373 3.04 22.231 4.74 26.158 6.83
Unemployment
1 -0.301 3.90 -0.700 4.54 1.253 4.83 0.198 2.69 -0.344 3.51 -0.274 2.51
Wages
2 0.131 3.29 -0.385 3.79 0.535 2.47 -0.243 2.43 -0.505 3.66
Entrepreneurs
3,4 -0.353 1.21 0.799 2.60 -0.187 1.48 0.200 1.03
Industry
5 0.030 2.11 0.106 5.68 0.124 4.44 -0.078 2.18
Agriculture
5 0.164 4.10 -0.296 2.13 -0.198 2.45
Pop.density [log] 2.180 6.27 -1.223 1.83 1.533 3.60 1.027 1.52 -2.569 6.73
Retirees
4 -0.468 6.51 -0.200 2.43 0.611 7.61
R^2 0.590 0.510 0.530 0.429 0.830 0.533 0.680
Adjusted R^2 0.481 0.379 0.404 0.322 0.751 0.367 0.595
National Vote 7.02 11.74 19.74 32.99 3.45 7.03 8.82
Std. Deviation 0.98 1.58 2.61 4.41 1.98 1.88 2.34
Notes: T-statistics in italics. Number of observations: 20. Estimation method: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR).
1 Unemployment rate in percent; 
2 Wage in thousands, national currency; 
3 Individual small entrepreneurs and/or self-employed, excl. farmers; 
4 Percentage of total
population; 
5 Percentage of total employment.21
Table 8. Regression Results, Hungary 1998: Determinants of Voting Behavior.
Variable Fidesz MDF SzDSz MSzP MP FKgP MIEP
t-stat pro-reform pro-reform pro-reform left left nationalist nationalist
Constant 38.754 5.71 4.129 3.13 4.446 2.06 22.658 3.51 -14.425 6.91 41.814 7.33 -0.570 0.18
Unemployment
1 -0.103 2.85 -0.340 4.24 0.379 2.25 0.350 5.56 -0.388 2.45 0.056 0.68
Wages
2 0.079 1.05 -0.207 1.93 0.178 3.35
Entrepreneurs
3,4 1.661 3.05 -0.442 1.88 -1.214 2.72
Industry
5 0.112 1.78 0.105 4.52 -0.231 4.39 -0.062 2.31
Agriculture
5 -0.553 2.38 0.689 3.34 -0.115 1.98 0.157 1.31 -0.087 1.20
Pop.density [log] -4.143 3.63 0.175 1.32 1.153 2.54 2.861 3.09
Retirees
4 -0.054 0.90 -0.731 3.67 0.663 7.14
R^2 0.226 0.246 0.712 0.315 0.754 0.639 0.621
Adjusted R^2 0.020 0.105 0.635 0.133 0.689 0.511 0.520
National Vote 28.37 3.13 8.11 32.10 4.15 13.41 5.64
Std. Deviation 3.79 0.59 1.52 3.38 1.89 3.08 1.64
Notes: T-statistics in italics. Number of observations: 20. Estimation method: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR).
1 Unemployment rate in percent; 
2 Wage in thousands, national currency; 
3 Individual small entrepreneurs and/or self-employed, excl. farmers; 
4 Percentage of total
population; 
5 Percentage of total employment.22
Table 9. Regression Results, Poland, Sejm Election in 1993 and Presidential Election in 1995: Determinants of Voting
Behavior.
Variable UD BBWR UP SLD PSL KPN Presidential Elections 1995
t-stat pro-reform pro-reform left left left nationalist Kwasniewski Walesa
Constant 24.172 3.68 7.282 2.55 -4.190 0.76 20.330 2.10 -21.707 1.80 12.490 2.80 2.359 0.10 97.641 4.20
Unemployment
1 -0.196 3.11 -0.079 1.82 0.079 1.51 0.304 2.39 0.171 1.19 -0.128 2.37 1.001 3.64 -1.001 3.64
Wages
2 1.929 2.14 1.617 2.02 4.393 2.05 -2.025 2.38 10.612 2.32 -10.612 2.32
Entrepreneurs
3,4 1.485 3.71 0.501 2.07 0.862 2.56 -0.980 3.09 3.997 2.30 -3.997 2.30
Industry
5 -0.182 2.57 -0.166 3.57 0.049 0.85 0.292 1.98 0.061 0.99 0.848 2.63 -0.848 2.63
Agriculture
5 -0.140 3.30 -0.071 2.02 -0.206 3.20 0.431 6.69
Pop.density [log] 1.440 1.98 2.164 3.82 -0.614 1.03 -4.392 2.88 1.981 2.72 -16.357 4.31 16.357 4.31
Retirees
4 -0.711 3.72 -0.615 4.47 -0.614 1.03 1.153 2.79 1.004 2.21 -0.372 2.17 3.186 3.65 -3.186 3.65
Univ. Educated
4 -0.245 2.15 0.285 1.81 -0.914 2.41 0.162 1.06 -0.868 1.04 0.868 1.04
R^2 0.819 0.449 0.695 0.513 0.773 0.421 0.634 0.634
Adjusted R^2 0.789 0.370 0.643 0.456 0.746 0.322 0.571 0.571
National Vote 10.60 5.40 10.60 20.40 15.40 5.80 51.72 48.28
Std. Deviation 3.94 1.72 2.49 5.29 9.11 2.04 11.94 11.94
Notes: T-statistics in italics. Number of observations: 49. Sejm election estimated as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR), presidential election estimated by OLS.
1 Unemployment rate in percent; 
2 Wage in thousands, national currency; 
3 Individual small entrepreneurs and/or self-employed, excl. farmers; 
4 Percentage of total
population; 
5 Percentage of total employment.23
Table10. Regression Results, Poland 1997: Determinants of Voting Behavior.
Variable AWS UW SLD PSL UP ROP
t-stat pro-reform pro-reform left left left nationalist
Constant 43.921 2.39 15.887 4.51 21.060 1.35 -3.805 0.52 2.372 0.72 -11.268 2.43
Unemployment
1 -0.366 1.69 -0.084 1.34 0.500 2.91 0.059 1.48 0.127 2.35
Wages
2 -35.183 2.70 16.107 1.58 12.660 2.08 4.150 1.70 7.345 2.35
Entrepreneurs
3,4 -2.052 1.41 1.168 2.90 1.356 1.36 0.815 1.20 -0.466 1.44
Industry
5 0.269 1.73 -0.339 2.60 0.115 2.81
Agriculture
5 0.510 4.25 -0.093 3.03 -0.436 3.97 0.084 1.06 -0.031 1.69 0.077 2.90
Pop.density [log] 9.584 5.23 -7.225 4.45 -1.778 4.27
Retirees
4 -3.284 4.67 -0.542 2.90 2.252 4.86 0.902 2.80 0.377 3.22 0.459 3.30
Univ. Educated
4 2.328 4.17 0.399 2.54 -1.363 2.97 -1.337 3.96 0.384 3.24
R^2 0.560 0.832 0.764 0.753 0.454 0.608
Adjusted R^2 0.484 0.812 0.717 0.718 0.376 0.552
National Vote 33.83 13.37 27.13 7.31 4.74 5.56
Std. Deviation 9.08 4.07 8.00 5.66 1.38 1.98
Notes: T-statistics in italics. Number of observations: 49. Estimation method: Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR).
1 Unemployment rate in percent; 
2 Wage in thousands, national currency; 
3 Individual small entrepreneurs and/or self-employed, excl. farmers; 
4 Percentage of total
population; 
5 Percentage of total employment.